I bought this book recently as part of my ongoing interest in the way the Second World War was essentially a continuation of the First World War and was not disappointed. While this review may not be as formal or long as some others, I did want to post a note about it so that others could decide if they were interested in it.

Taylor's book apparently caused a sensation when it came out in 1961 because it destroyed the "party line" that had been established in the world about Hitler and his role in starting the Second World War. Taylor doesn't argue that Hitler was somehow not a terrible person or a butcher. However, he argues, very compellingly, that Hitler did not have a coherent plan and in every crisis reacted to situations (as opposed to initiating them).

The Austrian crisis started when the British suggested that a revision of Germany's eastern borders was "natural", thus giving Hitler a green light for annexation before he had any concrete plans of his own. The final Anschluss was triggered by Schuschnigg's decision to call a surprise plebiscite on union with Germany as a desperate attempt to assert independence, knowing full well that France, Britain and even Italy (then Austria's "protector" ) were not willing to support him if it came to war.

The Czech crisis showed a combination of Hitler's opportunism and a disgusting abdication by France and Britain of any attempt at standing up for the principles that they professed. Taylor sees Munich as the defining moment in the pre-war years, but not for the reasons that Western politicians gave after the war. Munich, to Taylor's mind, convinced Hitler that the West would not go to war over any eastern "border revisions" of any sort, while it convinced Beck, the dictator of Poland, that any concessions to Hitler would result in complete capitulation (thus setting both sides up for a complete impasse over Danzig and the Corridor). When Hitler "broke" his promise by occupying the remainder of the Czech lands when Slovakia declared independence, although he may have been "reacting" yet again to forestall a Hungarian occupation of Slovakia, public opinion in the UK hardened against Hitler such that His Majesty's government was trapped by poorly-worded guarantees that they had made to the Poles (on behalf of themselves and the French, who were not happy at all to be bound in this manner).

There are certainly some visible flaws to the book. First, Taylor is a rampant apologist for Stalin. The notion that the Soviets were playing a duplicitous game with the West is tentatively expressed in a few places, only to be shot down by the author summarily and with no real evidence (in his defense, it should be noted that he had no access to Soviet archives that are now open). Second, Taylor somewhat underplays the Nazi ambitions and assumes that if there is no order from Hitler directing Nazis in Austria or the Sudetenland, it meant nothing was being orchestrated from Germany in the realm of agitation and troublemaking. Finally, he goes a bit too far in overplaying France's cowardice (some might prefer the term "pacifism" but I do not) and indecision.

On balance, however, the book is a fascinating analysis of the events that led to World War II, with the majority of the book discussing the years after Hitler came to power but a good 50 pages about the 1920s as well. It is interesting to see how expectations changed (Italy was seen as an ally up through the mid 1930s despite Mussolini's dictatorship, Britain expected a joint German-Polish invasion of the Soviet Union just before the German-Polish split) and alliances shifted.

I think that fans of political history will find it especially interesting, as well as anyone interested in World War II.