Every single thing you read on this topic, if it is not directly dealing with the Nazis-as-villains plot, feels compelled to waste pages of formulaic genuflections to an idea so universally agreed-upon, you would think it goes without saying: Namely, the fact of Hitler's moral shortcomings. And you can't really blame them, because of a corollary to Godwin's Law: that if you give Hitler the slightest credit for anything, you are automatically condoning, if not actually approving of the Holocaust. It was ONE thing he did, in a far more eventful career, and I personally have seen little evidence of his direct involvement (if not ultimate moral responsibility), as opposed to his very-much-hands-on direction of the diplomatic maneuverings and military strategy.
But heaven forbid anyone try to suggest that he had a little bit more on the ball in those latter areas than is generally supposed.
In fact, there is a lot to suggest he was vastly the superior of his contemporary significant heads of state in these spheres of activity, and that many of his decisions in those regard were not only rational and reasonable choices, but morally defensible as well. But we've got to acknowledge the Holocaust, which really, Hitler only gets infamy for because he had the werewithal to carry it out. Others in past times lacked his body count or efficiency simply because they lacked the means to achieve it (and possibly his ability to filter it through a bureaucracy and thus never need the perverse fortitude required to murder so many). Might as well call Genghis Khan a slug and a dawdler on the order of Montgomery because he moved his armies a lot slower than George Bush did in attacking Southern Asia.

Indeed. His pace & scope of military procurement and technical development hardly suggest a man planning a military conquest of the world.

Regarding these weaknesses, I strongly recommend Patrick Buchannan's "Churchill, Hitler & the Unnecessary War" and John Mosier's "Deathride". The former, while primarily an attack on the cult of Churchill, gets extensively into the causes and scenarios which led up to both World Wars, in particular the mindset and rationales behind the British, French & German actions. Though not particularly explored in this work, the author's long-standing conception of the two conflicts is as two halves of a single war, which he refers to as "The European Civil War". (Fun fact: my sister-in-law was reading it while pregnant and started crying over the Kaiser and how Buchanan exposes the falsity of his historical portrayal as a war-monger and a brute) While largely refraining from moral judgment, he shows the crises of Munich & Poland as cases where the decisions that have since been so reviled in each case, and blamed for the war, were actually made out of rather accurate perceptions of reality.

Mosier's work, while dealing more with the military side of things, and focusing almost exclusively on the conflict between the USSR & Germany addresses the issue of the Soviet Union's deceptions toward the west, though in "Deathride", he thoroughly explores this Soviet proclivity for deceit in order to make the case that this propensity is responsible for over a half-century of misconceptions of the Soviet-German conflict. He suggests that the pro-Soviet biases of many western historians (or even when not actively favoring the USSR, tending to accept Soviet figures and data at face value), as well as the misinterpretation of the relevance of certain basic facts (i.e. the larger population & geographical area of the USSR, the after-the-fact claims of the German generals of Hitler's incompetence dooming them, the unarguable defeat of Germany & occupation of the capital by Soviet troops) leads to the false conclusion that the Soviet Union was primarily responsible for the defeat of Germany. In fact, Mosier contends that Germany repeatedly had the USSR on the ropes, that many events characterized as German defeats had other explanations, but the Soviet Union has been allowed to sell these logistical halts or re-prioritization of objectives (in other words, German command decisions) as combat defeats thanks to their near-monopoly on the history of the war. In fact, the Soviet Union was Hitler's best ally while that arrangement lasted and perversely, the one he treated the worst (he stuck by Italy to an insane degree, and his declaration of war on the USA, solely to give moral support to his ally Japan, was, if Mosier is to be believed, the main cause of his undoing), but somehow, Poland's co-rapist managed to claim not only the honors as the slayer of the Nazi beast, but the lion's share of the spoils as well.

Buchanan goes into those issues as well, and demonstrates how some poor decision-making, possibly based on outdated foreign policies, led to England driving Mussolini into Hitler's arms over the Abyssinia crisis.