I am not frightened, but am concerned. - Edit 1
Before modification by Joel at 06/10/2012 01:28:57 PM
Realistically, the greatest concern by far is that, whether or not US anti-nuclear missile defenses are effective, they have yielded one long predicted effect: Chinas new DF-41 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM are both MIRV-capable. Chinas MIRV interest was long delayed by knowledge the US lacked means to intercept nuclear warheads, and Russia means beyond Moscow itself. America seeking means to defeat a high percentage of nuclear warheads, in turn spurred China to seek means to launch far more such warheads, including many decoys. That said, China has seemed a largely rational (if often provocative) actor since Maos death, an inclination their growing influence and accomplishments only reinforce. The more they have to lose, the less likely they are to sacrifice it.
Conventionally, China is rapidly gaining parity with Russia but still far behind the US in both technology and material. One of the observations I read in commentary on the new carrier China commissioned last week was that neither it nor Indias would make much difference in a conflict between the two countries except in "blue water:" The combined defensive force would hopelessly outmatch both carriers in assaults on land targets.
The consensus is Chinas new carrier is more a matter of prestige than military capability; a Soviet castoff purchased from Russia, analysts compare it to Americas Essex Class carriers. If you need an idea what that means: My dad served on an Essex Class (USS Bon Homme Richard, CVA-31) in the late fifties. It was state of the art—when launched the day before he turned 8, in 1944. Even at that, the Liaonings aircraft complement of 50 planes plus some helicopters is dwarfed by the 90+ fighters and fighter-bombers the Bonnie Dick carried in the '50s and the Nimitz Class carriers carry now.
A greater concern is Chinas moves toward stealth, but the PLA says the J-20 (supposedly) cannot enter service before 2017, and its top speed, agility, stealth-capable radar, and even overall stealth are serously questioned. The last is difficult to estimate since its current radar detectable components may be temporary, to facilitate flight tests. Perhaps most significant is the J-20 sacrificed speed and maneuverability for greater range than US Raptors and JSFs (the latter also scheduled for 2017 service.) That suggests a country seeking global power projection through a ground rather than carrier based air force.
The greatest issue is probably technological espion/sabotage and Chinese manufacturing growing at US expense, as ominous for defense contractors as for the rest of US manufacturing. Americas strategic dominance throughout most of the last century was directly due to its technological and production dominance. If the last two advantages disappear, the first must surely follow, since it depends almost entirely on them. However, that threat is more internal than external.
Conventionally, China is rapidly gaining parity with Russia but still far behind the US in both technology and material. One of the observations I read in commentary on the new carrier China commissioned last week was that neither it nor Indias would make much difference in a conflict between the two countries except in "blue water:" The combined defensive force would hopelessly outmatch both carriers in assaults on land targets.
The consensus is Chinas new carrier is more a matter of prestige than military capability; a Soviet castoff purchased from Russia, analysts compare it to Americas Essex Class carriers. If you need an idea what that means: My dad served on an Essex Class (USS Bon Homme Richard, CVA-31) in the late fifties. It was state of the art—when launched the day before he turned 8, in 1944. Even at that, the Liaonings aircraft complement of 50 planes plus some helicopters is dwarfed by the 90+ fighters and fighter-bombers the Bonnie Dick carried in the '50s and the Nimitz Class carriers carry now.
A greater concern is Chinas moves toward stealth, but the PLA says the J-20 (supposedly) cannot enter service before 2017, and its top speed, agility, stealth-capable radar, and even overall stealth are serously questioned. The last is difficult to estimate since its current radar detectable components may be temporary, to facilitate flight tests. Perhaps most significant is the J-20 sacrificed speed and maneuverability for greater range than US Raptors and JSFs (the latter also scheduled for 2017 service.) That suggests a country seeking global power projection through a ground rather than carrier based air force.
The greatest issue is probably technological espion/sabotage and Chinese manufacturing growing at US expense, as ominous for defense contractors as for the rest of US manufacturing. Americas strategic dominance throughout most of the last century was directly due to its technological and production dominance. If the last two advantages disappear, the first must surely follow, since it depends almost entirely on them. However, that threat is more internal than external.